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Abstract: The FD&C Act and FDA-promulgated regulations work together to bar off-label 
promotion by pharmaceutical companies.  This regulatory framework is often confusing and 
ambiguous, and FDA “guidance” on the issue has done relatively little to provide clarity.  There 
was a series of trials and appeals in the late 1990s on the constitutionality of such speech 
restrictions, in which the plaintiff claimed that by prohibiting commercial speech, the First 
Amendment rights of pharmaceutical companies were being violated.  But ultimately confusion 
perpetuated: although the cases culminated in an injunction against the FDA, the agency 
reinterpreted their guidance as merely safe harbors that provided no independent prosecutorial 
basis, rendering the court’s injunction moot.  Prosecution of pharmaceutical companies for off-
label promotion has increased over the past five years; recently, some pharmaceutical companies 
have responded by raising anew the First Amendment claims of a decade ago.  This time, 
however, the claims are more narrowly focused, and if the recent oral arguments in front of the 
Second Circuit are any indication, carry a strong chance of winning. 
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I. Introduction 
  Prosecution of pharmaceutical companies for promoting applications of their drugs that 
have not received FDA approval—known as off-label promotion—has skyrocketed in recent 
years, both in terms of number of cases and penalties handed out.
1  Earlier this year, the FDA 
changed their internal regulations to give agency members more freedom to pursue criminal 
investigations.
2  The FDA also delineated a specific roadmap for initiating criminal prosecutions 
of senior company officials under the Park Doctrine.
3  Despite these heavy potential sanctions, 
the underlying statutory and regulatory scheme is a morass of ambiguity, comprised mainly of 
FDA regulations promulgated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), which 
itself does not prohibit off-label promotion.  Recently, some of the companies being investigated 
by the FDA have responded by challenging the constitutionality of these rules.  The crux of the 
claim is that speaking about off-label uses for their own products constitutes commercial free 
speech, and while some limits can admittedly be applied, the prohibitions in place are so broad 
that they violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.  The D.C. Circuit saw a string of 
litigation on these constitutional issues in the late 1990s, with inconclusive results.
4  In the past 
year and a half, two major cases have been filed against the United States,
5 with one currently 
pending before the Second Circuit.  If the court finds that the FDA has restricted commercial 
speech too broadly in off-label promotion situations, it could trigger a major change in the 
FDA’s approach to prosecuting these violations. 
                                                             
1 SAMMY ALMASHAT ET AL., RAPIDLY INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 
1991–2010 at 2 (2010). 
2 JOHN T. BENTIVOGLIO & JENNIFER L. BRAGG, FDA REVAMPS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION GUIDELINES AND EXPANDS HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD‐RELATED INVESTIGATIONS 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FDA_Revamps_Criminal_Prosecution_Guidelines.pdf. 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 See Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 128 F.Supp.2d 11 (D.D.C. 2000). 
5 However, one suit was subsequently withdrawn as part of a settlement agreement with the Department of 
Justice. 3 
 
II. Evolution of the Current Regulatory Structure 
  The FD&C Act grants the FDA the authority to regulate promotional material put forth 
by drug and device manufacturers about their products.  Over eighty percent of promotional 
spending by pharmaceutical companies is directed at physicians,
6 making this channel of 
communication a major area of focus for the FDA.  One particular area of concern is when 
pharmaceutical companies provide information to physicians about the use of their product in 
situations other than those that have been approved by the FDA.  Physicians are allowed to 
prescribe a drug for an off-label use,
7 and in fact off-label use has become the standard of care 
for some patients, with providers receiving reimbursement through Medicare or Medicaid.
8  Yet 
companies still face stringent restrictions in their dissemination of materials to physicians 
regarding these off-label uses.  The FD&C Act does not explicitly prohibit off-label promotion, 
but the FDA has interpreted it to fall under the broad prohibitions against false or misleading 
advertising and introduction of a drug into interstate commerce without FDA approval for all of 
its intended uses.
9    
Labeling on FDA-approved drugs is prohibited from being “false or misleading in any 
particular.”
10  Labeling is defined broadly in the FD&C Act to include all labels and written 
material on or accompanying a product.
11  The Supreme Court in 1948 created a broad reading of 
                                                             
6 Regulating Prescription Drug Promotion, 108th Cong. (2003), (statement of Janet Woodcock, Director, Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115080.htm. 
7 Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug 
Administration: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (August 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 130). 
8 See, e.g., Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions for Coverage for Eng‐Stage Renal Disease Facilities, 73 
Fed. Reg. 20370, 20375 (Dep’t of Health and Human Services April 15, 2008) (final rule). 
9 Michelle Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off‐Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, New England 
Journal of Med., 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities In Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment at 6, Allergan, Inc. v. United States of 
America et al., No. 09‐1879. 
10 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2007). 
11 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2009). 4 
 
“accompanying,” such that the “textual relationship” between the product and the information is 
the determinative factor, regardless of the geographic or temporal distance between the two.
12  
Through regulations, the FDA has expanded the definition of labeling to its conceptual outer 
bounds, and “labeling” now encompasses everything from price lists and motion picture films to 
scientific journals and reference texts.
13  In contrast to the FD&C Act, on its face the FDA 
regulatory framework no longer explicitly require that material “accompany” a drug in order to 
be considered labeling.
14  A drug’s labeling may not imply a use other than those approved by 
the FDA; if the labeling does so, it becomes false and misleading in contravention of the FD&C 
Act.
15  Because the definition of “labeling” encompasses so many forms of communications 
from a drug manufacturer, it becomes easy for a pharmaceutical company to create a false or 
misleading label through truthful statements about their product’s off-label uses.
16   
The second, related prohibition against off-label promotion stems from inadequate 
directions for use.
17  Since 1962, manufacturers must obtain premarket approval for any new 
drug they wish to sell.
18  To obtain approval, the producer must show that the drug is “safe and 
effective for each of its intended uses.”
19  According to the FDA, if a drug takes on a new 
intended use, then it becomes a new drug, and the producer must prove the drug is safe and 
                                                             
12 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948). 
13 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2008). 
14 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2010); § 321(p) (2009); § 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2008).  
15 See e.g., Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998); John Osborn, Can I Tell 
You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off‐Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 308 (2010). 
16 Osborn, supra note 10, at 308. 
17 Specific Requirements on Content and format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs; Revision of “Pediatric 
Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 59 Fed. Reg. 64240, 64243 (Dec. 13, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
18 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (2009); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2010); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities In Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment, supra note 4, at 2–3.  
19 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment, 
supra note 4, at 3. 5 
 
effective for that new use.
20  A substance falls under the purview of the FDA as a drug if it is 
“intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or 
other animals.”
21  The FDA adopts a broad view of “intended use,” looking at the objective 
intent of the producer, as shown by labeling claims, advertising, or oral or written statements by 
the company.
22  Thus, if a drug manufacturer, through promotional claims about its products, 
makes a statement regarding a drug’s efficacy in an off-label use, then the off-label use becomes 
a statutory “intended use,” triggering the required proof of safety and efficacy.
23  Failure to 
include FDA-approved information about this new use on the label is misbranding.
24 
  If a pharmaceutical company provides information to a physician in response to an 
unsolicited request, the FDA will not subject these communications to the requirements of the 
FD&C Act.
25  But when pharmaceutical companies instigate contact with physicians, the FDA 
may exert its regulatory authority.
26  Because the FD&C Act does not explicitly forbid off-label 
promotion, the line separating advertising and labeling that does fall under the Act’s strictures 
from statements that do not has generally been formed through FDA-issued “guidance”
27 and 
case law.  During the 1990s, under the leadership of Dr. David Kessler, the FDA heightened its 
                                                             
20 Id. at 5. 
21 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2009). 
22 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (1976). 
23 Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or 
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical 
Devices, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694 (Jan. 13, 2009) (notice), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm; see also Osborn, supra note 10, at 309–
11. 
24 Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of 
Approved Drugs and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59820, 59822 (Nov. 18, 1994) (notice). 
25 Id. at 59823. 
26 Id. 
27 According to the FDA, guidance represents the agency’s “current thinking” on a topic, but does not “create or 
confer any rights” and is binding on neither the agency nor the regulated party.  Advertising and Promotion; 
Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52800, 52801 (Oct. 8, 1996) (notice). 6 
 
attention toward off-label use and promotion.
28  In the early 1990s, the FDA began, for the first 
time, to regulate the dissemination of literature by drug and device manufacturers if such 
materials discussed off-label uses.
29  The FDA’s policies in this area initially took the form of ad 
hoc, individual warning letters; the agency subsequently created more formal guidance 
documents.
30  
In 1992, the FDA introduced guidance describing the types of pharmaceutical-supported 
scientific and educational activities (such as continuing medical education seminars) that would 
be subject to the FD&C Act.
31  Five years later, after notice and comment, the FDA issued a final 
version of the guidance.
32  The FDA expressed concern that their policies would stifle academic 
discussion, which is why the agency explained that communications “independent of the 
promotional influence” of the manufacturer of the product at issue would not fall under the 
FD&C Act’s requirements, even if such communications discussed off-label uses for a drug.
33  
To make a determination of independence, the FDA would focus on a variety of factors, such as 
the extent to which the producer is able to use its presentation as an advertising mechanism,
34 
and the opportunity for meaningful discussion about the product.
35   
In 1996, the FDA expanded their guidance to reference texts and medical journal articles 
distributed by members of the pharmaceutical industry.
36  The FDA explicitly allowed 
pharmaceutical companies to circulate copies of journal articles about their products, as long as 
certain factors were met, most notably the “principle subject” of the articles must be FDA-
                                                             
28 Osborn, supra note 10, at n.36. 
29 Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 36 F.Supp.2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 1999). 
30 Id. 
31 Draft Policy Statement on Industry Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 56412 (Nov. 27, 
1992) (notice).  
32 Final Guidance on Industry‐Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64074 (Dec. 3, 1997).   
33 Final Guidance on Industry‐Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64076. 
34 Draft Policy Statement on Industry Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. at 56413–14.  
35 Final Guidance on Industry‐Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64087. 
36 Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996) (notice). 7 
 
approved uses for the products, and there must be a clear notification to the reader that the off-
label uses are unapproved.
37  Reference texts that are written and published “independent of the 
commercial interest” of the producer of the drug at issue may be distributed by that producer, as 
long as the listed requirements are met.
38  The reference text should not “have a significant 
focus” on unapproved uses of drugs produced by the firm distributing the materials, and if such 
information does play a minor role in the text, a company’s representatives are directed not to 
“refer to, or otherwise promote . . . information in the reference text that is not consistent” with 
the product’s FDA-approved labeling.
39 
  In 1997, Congress joined the conversation when they passed the FDA Modernization Act 
(FDAMA), modifying the FD&C Act.
40  The FDAMA allowed pharmaceutical companies to 
distribute information regarding off-label uses to physicians, insurance companies, and 
government agencies, as long as six factors were met: 
“(1) the drug was approved, (2) the information was not false or misleading; did not 
otherwise render the drug misbranded, was in the form of an unabridged reprint from a 
peer-review journal or reference publication, and would not pose a significant risk to 
public  health, (3) the information was not derived from another manufacturer’s research 
(absent permission), (4) the  manufacturer submitted the information to FDA 60 days 
before its distribution, (5) the manufacturer had submitted a supplemental NDA to FDA 
for approval of the use described (or certified that a supplemental NDA would be 
submitted within six months), and (6) the reprint included a prominent statement that the 
use had not been approved, [along with] a copy of the approved labeling.”
41 
 
                                                             
37 Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. at 52801. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 FDA.com, Food, Drug, and Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmen
dmentstotheFDCAct/FDAMA/default.htm (last visited February 20, 2011).  The FDA promulgated implementing 
regulations the next year.  Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, 
and Devices, 21 C.F.R. 99 (2011) (final rule). 
41 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 549 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2007) 
(1980). 8 
 
The FDAMA provisions applied to scientific journals and texts, but did not mention CME 
seminars.  Few pharmaceutical companies took advantage of the Act’s mechanism for 
distributing off-label information.
42  The requirement that a manufacturer submit or commit to 
submitting a supplemental NDA for the off-label use entailed clinical trial expenses many 
companies were not interested in incurring.  Some of Congress’s other proposals took a more 
permissive attitude toward off-label use and promotion, but the FDA met these suggestions with 
hostility.  For example, Senate bill 1477 would have created a special mechanism for FDA 
approval of new (off-label) uses for current drugs if the off-label use was practiced for five years, 
was “common” among physicians, and was “reasonable” based on existing experience and 
evidence.
43  Dr. Kessler blasted the proposition as one that would create a gaping hole in the 
current requirement to prove a new drug’s effectiveness, returning the FDA to the pre-1962 era 
of drug regulation.
44 
  The FDAMA lapsed on September 30, 2006, and was not replaced by new legislation on 
the subject.
45  In 2008, the FDA posted notice of proposed guidance on the issue of distribution 
by drug and device manufacturers of scientific journals and texts that discuss off-label uses of 
their products.
46  The final version of the FDA’s “current thinking on ‘Good Reprint Practices’” 
was released in January of 2009.
47  If a manufacturer follows these guidelines, the FDA “does 
                                                             
42 Id. 
43 Protecting and Promoting Public Health: Hearing on S. 1477 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human 
Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Dr. David A. Kessler, 
Comm'r, FDA), available at http:// www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115101.htm. 
44 Id.  
45 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 549 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2007) 
(1980). 
46 Draft Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and 
Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared 
Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 9342 (Feb. 20, 2008) (notice). 
47 Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or 
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical 
Devices, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694‐01 (Jan. 13, 2009) (notice), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprint.html. 9 
 
not intend” to consider the distribution of articles and texts discussing off-label uses as creating a 
new and unapproved “intended use.”
48  There are many similarities between the 2009 guidance 
and the FDAMA, such as restrictions on whom information can be disseminated to, and 
disclosure requirements about the distributor’s interest in the product and the unapproved nature 
of the use.
49  However in other respects, the 2009 guidance is more lenient than its predecessor.  
For example, while the FDAMA required a pharmaceutical company to submit or commit to 
submitting a supplemental NDA for the off-label use its literature was discussing, the new 
guidance does not mention requirements for a supplemental NDA.
50  The FDAMA mandated 
that any literature discussing off-label uses be submitted to the FDA 60 days before distribution; 
the 2009 guidance is again silent on such notification.
51  Under the FDAMA regime, the clinical 
data underlying articles or texts was not allowed to originate from another company’s research, 
absent explicit permission.
52  The 2009 guidance allows any “adequate and well-controlled 
clinical studies” that were published in a medical journal or text to serve as the basis for 
materials the company distributes.
53  However, unlike the FDAMA, the guidance creates no 
explicit safe harbor for pharmaceutical companies, and thus complying with the FDA’s 
suggestions does not prevent possible liability. 
Some challenged the FDA’s recent guidance as overly permissive.  In a letter to FDA 
Commissioner Andrew Eschenbach, Henry Waxman, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, blasted the guidance for “undercutting” the traditional 
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Michelle Mello et al., Shifting 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Journal 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Med., 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Id. 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Id. 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prohibition on off-label promotion.
54  Judy Cahill, Executive Director of the Academy of 
Managed Care Pharmacy, complained that the FDA’s new unofficial rules were insufficient to 
protect against dissemination of biased research, which could create mistaken beliefs among 
healthcare providers about the efficacy of off-label uses.
55  Others praised the guidance for 
allowing drug producers to close the information gap that can result during the often long delays 
for drug approval, during which time a company is aware of a trend of successful off-label use, 
but would otherwise face constraints on sharing this information with physicians.
56  One example 
cited by supporters of the new guidance is Herceptin, a drug produced by Genentech that 
decreases the chance of breast cancer relapse.
57  It was not until two years after studies indicated 
its efficacy that the drug was approved for this use by the FDA.
58  During the intervening time, 
many physicians did not prescribe the drug, to the potential detriment of many patients.
59  
Genentech blamed the delayed adoption of Genentech on their inability to circulate information 
about its efficacy to physicians.
60 
 
III. Initial Challenges to the Constitutionality of FDA Regulation of Off-Label Promotion  
 
  Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), a non-profit organization that engages in litigation 
to support the free market,
61 took the lead in challenging the constitutionality of the FDA’s 
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regulation of off-label promotion.  In 1998, in the District Court of the District of Columbia, 
WLF embarked upon the first round of what would be a multi-year battle with the FDA.
62  WLF 
argued the FDA’s 1996 and 1997 guidance documents were unconstitutional because, in 
restricting manufacturer promotion of off-label uses, they violated the First Amendment’s 
protection of commercial speech.
63  The FDA tried to claim that promotional activities are 
conduct, not speech, a notion the court swiftly dismissed.
64  As the court noted, drug and device 
labeling issues have been consistently analyzed, not as conduct, but under the framework of 
commercial speech.
65  Commercial speech is generally defined as speech by a commercial entity 
“that wishes to financially benefit from the message.”
66  Just as quickly, the court rejected the 
FDA’s assertion that, because of their broad power to regulate in the field of prescription drugs, 
the government could restrict commercial speech without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.
67  Resigned to defending the restrictions as acceptable limitations on commercial 
speech, the FDA had to prove their policies passed the Central Hudson commercial speech test.
68  
Under Central Hudson, commercial speech can be constrained if the speech is unlawful or 
inherently misleading, or alternately, if the government has a substantial interest achieved by the 
regulations, the interest is directly advanced by the restrictions, and the restrictions are not 
substantially more restrictive than necessary (however, using the least restrictive means available 
is not required).
69    
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With respect to the first factor, the FDA argued the speech did involve illegal activities, 
and thus could be restricted, because promoting an off-label use renders the drug misbranded, in 
violation of the FD&C Act.  The court rejected this argument, explaining that the crux of the 
inquiry is not whether the commercial speech itself violates a law (as the FDA was implying), 
but instead whether the behavior promoted by the speech is unlawful.
70  Because physicians can 
legally prescribe drugs for off-label uses, the commercial speech encourages a lawful activity.
71  
While the first half of this prong of Central Hudson was not a close call for the court, the inquiry 
into whether the commercial speech was misleading entailed a more detailed analysis.  
“Inherently misleading” is a high bar, and speech that simply may be misleading in some 
circumstances is not sufficient to remove the speech from Central Hudson analysis.
72  Although 
the FDA asserted in their motion for summary judgment that off-label promotion is inherently 
misleading,
73 in the very guidance documents at issue, they had previously described such 
statements as only “potentially misleading.”
74  According to the court, “the FDA was right the 
first time.”
75  Simply because a researcher publishes a claim in a medical journal, and the FDA 
has not yet evaluated that claim, does not mean the statement is inherently misleading.
76  The 
FDA also admitted that if information about off-label uses originates from a source other than 
the manufacturer, or is given by the manufacturer at the request of a physician, then the FDA has 
no objection.
77  To the court, this stance was inconsistent with a claim that such statements are 
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inherently misleading, because a statement cannot be inherently misleading if it becomes 
problematic only in certain situations, or only when certain parties distribute the information.
78   
The court then moved on to examining whether the restrictions on this lawful/non-
misleading speech advanced any substantial government interests.  The FDA claimed two such 
interests were promoted by their guidance documents: ensuring physicians receive accurate 
information about drugs, in order to make appropriate prescription decisions, and creating 
incentives for drug manufacturers to seek FDA approval for current off-label uses.
79  The court 
rejected the first rationale, refusing to recognize a paternalistic attempt to “protect” doctors from 
commercial speech as an important goal.
80  However, the FDA’s second submitted interest was 
sufficiently substantial to meet the second prong of the Central Hudson test.  WLF tried to argue 
that moving a use from off-label to on-label does not necessarily promote greater public health.
81  
The court, on the other hand, pointed to the congressional requirement that all marketed uses for 
drugs be proven safe and effective by the FDA, and deferred to this determination of the 
importance of moving common uses for drugs onto the labeling.
82 
Under the third prong of Central Hudson, the government restrictions must advance the 
substantial interest directly, providing more than “remote support.”
83  The court concluded the 
FDA’s regulations did directly advance the government’s interest in having off-label uses go 
through the approval process.  Given the many economic incentives drug manufacturers have to 
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shirk the rigors of a supplemental NDA, the court was persuaded that the restrictions provide an 
appropriate counterbalance.
84 
The fourth prong was the downfall for the FDA; the court found that the restrictions were 
far more expansive than was necessary for the government to achieve its goals.
85  While the 
court reiterated that the FDA was not required to adopt the least restrictive means available, the 
court explained they reached their decision largely because multiple other, less burdensome 
options existed.
86  As an acceptable alternative means, the court pointed to a more limited 
requirement that manufacturers simply be required to clearly disclose on the label that certain 
uses are not approved by the FDA.
87  Such a restriction, while clearly less inhibiting than the 
FDA’s prior policies, would still achieve the FDA’s goals, because there would be no danger in 
the speech being misleading and the incentive to get a supplemental NDA (and thus access to a 
wider variety of marketing opportunities) would still be present.
88  Because of this flaw, the court 
declared the policies, rules, and regulations contained in the FDA’s guidance documents to be 
unconstitutional, and issued an injunction barring any U.S. agency from prohibiting drug and 
device manufacturers from distributing peer-reviewed journal articles or reference texts that 
discussed off-label uses.
89  Drug and device companies were also to be allowed to recommend 
speakers and topics to independent organizers of CME events, regardless of whether their 
recommendations would lead to off-label uses being discussed.
90   
  The district court’s opinion in Friedman was handed down on July 30, 1998; on 
November 21, 1998, the FDAMA, through its implementing regulations, superseded the FDA’s 
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guidance documents regarding scientific journals and reference texts.
91  WLF returned to the 
district court, claiming that the provisions of the FDAMA dealing with off-label use were 
inconsistent with the court’s injunction.
92  According to WLF, the FDAMA suffered the same 
constitutional defects as the FDA guidance because it severely restricted, in ways more 
restrictive than necessary, distribution of journal articles and reference texts regarding off-label 
uses.
93  In early 1999, the FDA asked that the injunction be modified to explicitly apply only to 
their 1996 and 1997 guidance documents, thus allowing the FDAMA’s off-label promotion 
clauses to stand.
94  The court denied this request, and instead asked for supplemental briefs from 
both parties discussing the impact of the injunction on the FDAMA.
95  Later that year, the court 
determined that the FDAMA maintained the same policies held unconstitutional in Friedman, 
and therefore the FDA was enjoined from enforcing it.
96  The court acknowledged that the 
FDAMA modified the FDA’s policy toward manufacturer distribution of articles and texts that 
discuss off-label uses, but it did not change the agency’s approach so as to erase the 
unconstitutional nature of the restrictions.
97   
After analyzing the parties’ briefs, the court began by again applying the Central Hudson 
test for restrictions on commercial speech.
98  The court largely reiterated its analysis from 
Friedman regarding prongs one and two.
99  With respect to prong three, the court found that only 
one of the FDAMA’s requirements directly advanced the government’s legitimate interest in 
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incentivizing supplemental NDAs.
100  This provision granted manufacturers permission to 
distribute articles concerning off-label uses if they met one of three requirements: they submitted 
a supplemental NDA, certified to the FDA that they would soon be submitting a supplemental 
NDA, or the Secretary of Health and Human Services determined the manufacturer to be exempt 
from submitting a supplemental NDA (for example, because the associated clinical studies of the 
off-label use would be unethical or prohibitively expensive).
101  The FDAMA’s other restrictions 
on distribution, such as requiring an attached bibliography on all articles and reference texts 
discussing off-label uses, did advance the asserted goal of ensuring that physicians receive 
accurate and complete information, but this government interest was not a legitimate one under 
prong two.
102   
However, the FDAMA provision that did directly advance a government interest failed 
prong four of Central Hudson because the means of achieving this goal were far more broad than 
necessary.
103  The court blasted the FDAMA for committing a kind of “constitutional 
blackmail,” by conditioning the exercise of First Amendment rights upon the submission of a 
supplemental NDA.
104  The 1998 injunction was then amended to explicitly declare the FDAMA 
and its implementing regulations unconstitutional.
105  The injunction made clear, however, that 
the FDA was still free to place limitations on the dissemination of false or misleading 
information, or to require certain disclosures regarding the unapproved nature of the uses 
discussed.
106 
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  The FDA appealed the district court’s decision,
107 but the anticipated constitutional battle 
never arose.  During oral arguments before the D.C. Court of Appeals, the FDA made a strategic 
change in position, claiming that the FDAMA and 1997 guidance regarding educational 
activities (CME guidance) merely created “safe harbors”: if manufacturers meet these provisions, 
they would be safe from prosecution on the basis of the information they distributed or 
educational activity they were involved in.
108  However, in and of themselves these policies and 
regulations did not authorize the FDA to proscribe speech or grant the agency any independent 
prosecutorial authority.
109  If, for example, a pharmaceutical company violated the safe harbor 
provisions by distributing information without promising to file a supplemental NDA, then the 
FDA could still exercise its long-established authority to prosecute for misbranding.
110 
In response to the FDA’s new position, WLF no longer contended that the agency was 
unconstitutionally restricting commercial speech.
111  However, WLF, citing the principle that 
“voluntary cessation of challenged conduct will only moot a case if ‘subsequent events made it 
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 
recur,’” still asked the Court of Appeals to affirm the district court’s modification of the 
injunction.
112  If the court did not, the organization feared that the FDA would nonetheless 
subsequently prosecute violations of the FDAMA or CME guidance.
113   The Court of Appeals 
refused to do so, explaining that the issue before the court was the facial constitutionality of the 
FDAMA and CME guidance, and because WLF agreed these policies were no longer 
unconstitutional under the FDA’s new interpretation, there was no longer a disagreement 
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between the parties.
114  Furthermore, there was no issue of “voluntary cessation,” as WLF had 
made no claim of action taken by the FDA pursuant to the documents at issue.
115  The Court of 
Appeals then vacated the lower court’s order and injunction to the extent they pronounced the 
FDAMA and CME guidance unconstitutional.
116   
In response to the Court of Appeals decision, the FDA in March 2000 issued a notice 
explaining the scope of their regulatory power.
117  The FDA reiterated that if drug and device 
manufacturers fail to follow the FDAMA or CME guidance, this is not an independent violation 
of the law.
118  However if a manufacturer does not comply with the safe harbors established 
therein, the FDA “may bring an enforcement action under the FDCA, and seek to use journal 
articles and reference texts disseminated by the manufacturer as evidence that an approved 
product is intended for a ‘new use.’”
119  In the final court case of the saga, WLF responded to 
this notice by returning to the district court.
120  WLF complained that, by using dissemination of 
journal articles as evidence of a new, off-label use, and then prosecuting for misbranding, the 
FDA was effectuating the same policies which the district court had declared unconstitutional in 
1999.
121  In a terse response, the district court explained that, because the Court of Appeals 
“wholly vacated” their injunction, there was nothing the FDA’s notice could violate.
122  The 
district court criticized the FDA for completely obfuscating any sense of permissible conduct for 
pharmaceutical companies in this area, and expressed frustration with the Court of Appeals for 
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dodging the issue, instead of using the opportunity to provide finality and clarity.
123  The court 
ended the Washington Legal Foundation series of cases with a prediction: given the lack of 
definitive answers generated by the litigation, they would soon be required to weigh in on the 
issue again.
124 
 
IV. Recent Constitutional Challenges  
 
  Recently, the FDA has stepped up their prosecution of off-label promotion.  Such cases 
virtually always end in settlement because pharmaceutical companies are risk-averse: they fear 
potentially higher penalties that could be meted down after a court conviction, as well as possible 
agency retaliation if they fight back and contest the charges.
125  Additionally, off-label promotion 
can sometimes be attached to a larger charge of defrauding the government, conviction of which 
leads to a mandatory five-year exclusion from the profitable Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.
126  In the past twenty years, there have been 165 settlements between the FDA and the 
pharmaceutical industry, with a total of $19.8 billion paid out in penalties.
127  121 of the 
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Under the government’s permitting eyes, 
pharmaceutical companies that are “too big to fail” can create a subsidiary shell company, which the government 
then excludes from Medicare/Medicaid, while the parent company is still allowed to participate and sell its 
products.  See, e.g., Drew Griffin & Andy Segal, Feds Found Pfizer Too Big to Fail, CNN, Apr. 2, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/04/02/pfizer.bextra/index.html?hpt=T2. 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1, at 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settlements, constituting $14.8 billion in penalties, have occurred in the past five years.
128  Some 
commentators explain that this phenomenon of increasing penalties is the result of 
pharmaceutical companies pursuing increasingly aggressive promotional practices in the face of 
temptingly lucrative profits from off-label drug sales.
129  Despite large fines, the profits from 
increased off-label prescribing can more than make up the difference.  When Pfizer was 
prosecuted for promotional practices surrounding its Cox-2 inhibitor Bextra, for example, the 
$1.2 billion fine ultimately levied represented only three months’ profit for the company.
130    
These heightened penalties have led to renewed claims that the FDA’s policies 
unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment protections of commercial speech.  This 
time, however, the issue is being raised not by third party advocacy groups, but rather by the 
parties being investigated for off-label promotion.  One of the most high-profile instances 
occurred in the fall of 2009 when Allergan, the maker of Botox, decided to fight back after the 
FDA filed charges alleging that the company was aggressively promoting Botox for multiple off-
label uses.
131   
Botox is approved to treat several conditions, such as crossed eyes and involuntary neck 
contractions.
132  Physicians frequently prescribe Botox for patients who are dealing with 
conditions associated with spasticity, such as the involuntary muscle contractions suffered by 
those with cerebral palsy.
133  While treating spasticity is not an FDA-approved use for Botox,
134 
the drug has become so frequently prescribed in this area that the United States Pharmacopeia 
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See, e.g., David Evans, When Drug Makers’ Profits Outweigh Penalties, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2010, at G1. 
130 See, e.g., Griffin & Segal, supra note 121. 
131 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to 
Resolve Allegations of Off‐Label Promotion of Botox (Sept. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html. 
132 Complaint ¶ 51, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09‐1879 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2009). 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Id. ¶¶ 55–56. 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and Drugdex compendiums have listed the product every year since 2002 for at least one 
spasticity-related indication,
135 and Botox prescriptions written to treat spasticity are reimbursed 
by Medicare.
136  Allergan was also working to move this use on-label, and had submitted a 
supplemental Biologics License Application in August 2008, requesting FDA approval for using 
Botox to treat upper-limb spasticity after stroke.
137   
The FDA, through its Adverse Event Reporting System, had received information about 
adverse side effects in Botox users, both for approved and unapproved uses.
138  In response, the 
FDA asked Allergan to update the labeling on Botox.
139  Allergan’s proposed labeling was 
rejected by the FDA, and the company ultimately implemented the FDA-suggested version.
140  
This label singled out an elevated risk of respiratory complications in children receiving Botox to 
treat spasticity.
141  Allergan wanted to supplement this new labeling with additional, more 
detailed information for physicians regarding Botox and spasticity treatment, such as optimal 
injection sites and dosage levels, in order to reduce the risk of adverse events.
142  The proposed 
distribution of information would have been in the form of print and electronic communications 
to physicians, as well as presentations at the meetings of professional societies.
143  The 
information would not have modified any of the current labeling on the product itself.
144  
Allergan explains that the current regulatory regime puts them at risk for criminal charges and 
financial penalties if they disseminate this truthful, non-misleading information to physicians 
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about how to minimize the risks associated with the current off-label uses of their products.   
Claiming that such restrictions on truthful speech are unconstitutional, in October of 2009 
Allergan sued the FDA in the District Court for the District of Columbia, for infringing upon 
their First Amendment rights.
145  On the same day, Allergan also filed a motion seeking a 
preliminary injunction, in order to prevent the FDA from using the FD&C Act and agency 
regulations to chill their proposed speech.
146  Although Allergan ultimately dropped their suit as 
part of a settlement deal in October 2010,
147 their complaint, in conjunction with the documents 
the government submitted in response,
148 create a fairly well-developed view of the issues at the 
heart of this debate.  
Allergan claimed that the regulatory regime is facially unconstitutional in four main 
aspects.
149  Count I of the complaint alleged that the definition of “labeling,” as promulgated by 
the FDA in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2), is unconstitutional.  The FD&C Act defines “labeling” as 
“all labels and other written, printed, or graphic material (1) upon any article or any of its 
containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”
150 Allergan argued the FDA redefined 
“labeling” in a way that “extend[s] far beyond its statutory mooring,” and the agency will not be 
able to prove that this unrestrained new definition of “labeling” is no more restrictive than 
necessary, as required by prong four of the Central Hudson test for acceptable limitations on 
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commercial speech.
151  To support their contention, Allergan pointed to the expansive list of 
materials the FDA stated they would consider to be labeling.  This list includes:  
Brochures, booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, 
catalogs, house organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound recordings, 
exhibits, literature, and reprints and similar pieces of printed, audio, or visual matter descriptive 
of a drug and references published (for example, the “Physicians Desk Reference”) for use by 
medical practitioners, pharmacists, or nurses, containing drug information supplied by the 
manufacturer, packer, or distributor of the drug and which are disseminated by or on behalf of its 
manufacturer, packer, or distributor are hereby determined to be labeling as defined in section 
201(m) of the act.
152   
 
From Allergan’s perspective, this regulation turns any tangible material distributed by a 
manufacturer and containing manufacturer-provided drug information into “labeling.”
153  As a 
result, a conflict is formed between the FD&C Act, which creates FDA jurisdiction over 
materials on or “accompany[ing]” the drug, and the agency-promulgated regulation, which drops 
the “accompany” requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 321(m).
154  The defendants maintained that the 
definition in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) falls within their statutory authority as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court over sixty years ago in United States v. Kordel.
155  Kordel defines “accompany” 
broadly, as any material that “supplements or explains” the product.
156 The focus is on the 
functional and textual relationship between a drug and the material alleged to be “labeling.”
157  
The government maintained that the materials listed in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) are all items that 
“accompany” drugs in a functional, Kordel sense of the word; thus the regulation preserves, 
albeit implicitly, the requirement that labeling “accompany” the regulated product.
158   
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Dismiss, 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In contrast, Allergen interpreted “accompany” to mean materials “sent along with . . . [the 
product] in connection with its sale” and “distributed along with the drug.”
159  Allergan cited 
dictionary definitions and focused on the “ordinary meaning” of “accompany” to argue that 
Congress did not intend the word to be so broad as to includes materials not sent with a drug in 
connection with its sale.
160  Allergen did not disavow the Kordel definition of “accompany,” and 
in fact cited the case in support of their motion for preliminary injunction.
161  However, Allergan 
criticized the government for selectively relying on certain phrases in Kordel.
162  Per Allergan’s 
interpretation, Kordel put forth a more limited holding than that cited by the government, 
essentially creating a four-factor test: written materials will be deemed to accompany a product, 
despite being sent in a different shipment, if they are “(1) sent from the same place; (2) to the 
same place; (3) as part of an ‘integrated…transactio[n]’; and (4) they ‘supplement or explain’ the 
use of the drug, thereby having a ‘textual relationship’ to it.”
163   
This seems to be a stretched reading of Kordel.  The Court makes a sweeping statement 
that “one article or thing is accompanied by another when it supplements or explains it,” and 
nowhere in the opinion does the Court indicate this is limited to situations involving products 
sent to and from the same location.  The Court did emphasize that the transactions involved were 
too “integrated” to allow the defendants to claim that the explanatory materials sent in another 
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package did not constitute “labeling.”  However, the Court’s discussion in this regard did not 
connote the physical restrictions Allergan seeks to read into the opinion.  Instead, the explanation 
functioned mainly to support the Court’s point that if written materials and a product are so 
connected that one explains the other, this integration is sufficient to create a nexus such that the 
material will still be deemed labeling, despite geographical or temporal distance.  Because of the 
broad holding in Kordel, Allergan probably would have lost the claim that 21 C.F.R. § 
201.1(l)(2) directly conflicts with 21 U.S.C. § 321(m).     
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of their Kordel interpretation, Allergan retreated fairly 
quickly to an alternate argument, claiming that the district court should apply the canon of 
constitutional avoidance: In order to circumvent possible First Amendment concerns about the 
breadth of the FDA’s ability to restrict speech, the court should interpret the word “accompany” 
narrowly, so as not to include materials generally distributed to physicians and unconnected with  
the sale of products.
164  Allergan cited the D.C. Circuit’s 2008 decision in Kempthorne for the 
proposition that “the canon of constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron deference.”
165  Although 
the Kempthorne court ultimately found the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs to be 
insufficiently “serious” to warrant abandoning Chevron deference,
166 five years earlier the court 
did refuse to accord such deference to a government agency that “failed to tailor its disclosure 
policy to avoid unnecessarily infringing upon [the plaintiff’s] First Amendment rights.”
167  The 
government’s court filings never addressed the canon of constitutional avoidance, but they may 
have had reason to worry.  Particularly in situations where a pharmaceutical company had 
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already applied for a supplemental NDA, the court may well have found the speech restrictions 
sufficiently serious to warrant a refusal to apply Chevron deference to the FDA interpretation of 
“accompany.” 
  In Count II of their complaint, Allergan claimed that 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), which renders 
misbranded any drug with labeling that is “false or misleading in any particular,” is 
unconstitutional when used to restrict truthful, non-misleading statements.
168  Allergan explained 
that under the government’s interpretation of the FD&C Act, § 352(a) operates to ban all 
“labeling” mentioning off-label uses if the FDA has not reviewed and approved the statement.
169  
This ban is implemented regardless of whether the statements are truthful and accurately depict 
scientific research.
170  As a result, the government is essentially banning truthful speech because 
it has not been approved by the government, the very essence of a First Amendment violation.
171   
To support this allegation about FDA policy, Allergan pointed to the government’s prior 
statements during the 2004 prosecution of Warner-Lambert for off-label promotion.  In the 
sentencing memorandum, the government stated that pharmaceutical companies would violate § 
352(a) simply by making a “suggest[ion] that a drug is safe and effective for uses which have not 
been approved by the FDA.”
172  In its Motion to Dismiss, the government admitted they made 
this statement, but explained that Allergan had taken the remark out of context.  Warner-Lambert 
had made promotional claims regarding the safety and effectiveness of one of their products, 
despite an earlier rejection by the FDA for such a use.  In the context of a prior FDA rejection, 
then, it is false and misleading for a pharmaceutical company to “suggest that a drug is safe and 
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effective for uses which have not been approved by the FDA,” a more narrow proposition the 
government continued to defend as legitimately within their regulatory purview.
173  
  The government maintained that, absent such a prior FDA rejection, statements by 
manufacturers regarding the safety and effectiveness of unapproved uses are not inherently 
misleading, simply because the FDA has not granted its imprimatur to the claims.
174  To prove 
this was the Agency’s position, the government pointed to 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(3), a regulation 
which prohibits the labeling on prescription drugs from including implied claims or suggestions 
if these claims rest on “inadequate evidence of safety or a lack of substantial evidence of 
effectiveness.”
175  If the FDA’s position was truly as Allergan claimed, they responded, then 21 
C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(3) would be completely redundant, because even if an implied claim was 
accompanied by adequate proof of safety and effectiveness, it would still be inherently 
misleading without FDA approval, and thus prohibited.
176  For further support, the government 
pointed to analogous statements made to the court by Dr. Robert Temple, Director of the Office 
of Medical Policy in the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
177 
It is significant that while contesting Allergan’s claim, the government could point to no 
agency statement or action in order to affirmatively show that the reigning policy was other than 
as Allergan described.  Instead, they were relegated to indirectly proving that this could not be 
their policy because it conflicted with the implications of other regulations.  Furthermore, if a 
producer’s statement about his product’s safety and efficacy for an unapproved use is not 
inherently “false or misleading,” simply because it lacks FDA approval, then the question 
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remains: what determines the line between off-label claims for unapproved uses that are false 
and misleading, and those that are not?  The government did not illuminate the distinction, 
declaring only that references to unapproved uses as part of labeling “can be false or 
misleading.”
178   
In an attempt to provide some clarity, the government gave two examples of speech 
regarding off-label uses that will be held to be “false and misleading” under § 352(a): if a drug 
company implies that the FDA approved the drug, when in fact the agency did not, and when a 
drug company implies that a product’s safety and effectiveness have been proven, when they 
have not.  But by using two examples of blatantly and objectively false statements, the 
government inappropriately shifts the scope of the argument.  The heart of the issue is an inquiry 
into when, if at all, truthful statements about off-label uses can be struck down as “false and 
misleading.”  While the government may have successfully proven that they never established a 
policy branding such statements as always “false and misleading,” the inquiry remains: when 
does the government label such truthful claims as “false and misleading”?  When is it 
constitutionally acceptable to do so?   
The lack of clarity for drug and device manufacturers is problematic.  As of now, the only 
way manufacturers can receive a hint of the rules that will be applied to them is through FDA-
issued guidance.  For example, the January 2009 guidance
179 helped establish a line between 
truthful journal reprints that will and will not be interpreted as claiming a new use for the drug (if 
the latter, the drug would be rendered misbranded, because the labeling does not discuss all of 
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the drug’s uses).  However, because the January 2009 guidance is limited to the relatively narrow 
scope of journal articles, it is only a small step toward fixing a much larger problem. 
  Count III of Allergan’s complaint entailed a claim that 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a), 
which bans advertisements of off-label uses, is unconstitutional, or invalid as an unreasonable 
interpretation of § 352(n) of the FD&C Act.
180  § 352(n) of the FD&C Act renders 
advertisements for prescription drugs “misbranded,” and thus barred from interstate commerce, 
if they fail to disclose the “established name” of the drug, its chemical formula, and a summary 
of other “information . . . relating to its side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness” as the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services may choose to require.
181  If these hurdles are met, then 
the prescription drug advertisement is legal under the FD&C Act.
182  The FDA promulgated 21 
C.F.R. § 202.1 to further detail the requirements for prescription drug advertisements.
183  
Allergan claimed subsection (e)(4)(i)(a) of this regulation is in conflict with § 352(n), because 
the former creates an additional requirement not found in the FD&C Act: a drug is “misbranded” 
if any advertisement for the product “recommend[s] or suggest[s]” an off-label use, regardless of 
whether the drug’s advertisements meet all of the disclosure requirements set forth in § 
352(n).
184  This added condition renders subsection (e)(4)(i)(a) invalid as an unreasonable 
interpretation of § 352(n).
185  Additionally, Allergan maintained that, by creating a per se ban on 
off-label prescription drug advertising, subsection (e)(4)(i)(a) is unconstitutional because its 
restriction on free speech is far broader than necessary to achieve the government’s goal of 
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incentivizing FDA approval for off-label uses.
186  As an example of less restrictive policies the 
government could implement, Allergan cited an alternate rule that would require manufacturers 
to simply disclose in the advertisement that the off-label use is not FDA approved.
187  However, 
prohibiting all off-label advertisements, without distinguishing between ones that are truthful and 
non-misleading and ones that are not, or ones that meet the disclosure requirements of § 352(n) 
and ones that do not, is far too broad to be sustained under Central Hudson.
188 
  The government responded by first explaining how 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) is 
consistent with § 352(n).  § 352(n) allows the Secretary to require advertisements to contain 
certain “information . . . relating to . . . effectiveness,” which necessarily includes information 
about the product’s effectiveness in the field of unapproved uses.
189   The FDA can choose, as it 
has, to limit advertisements’ information about effectiveness to claims that have been proven 
through the new drug approval process.
190   
The government also crafted an argument for why 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) does not 
conflict with the First Amendment under Central Hudson’s analysis.  The government first 
claimed that because this regulation deals with speech that promotes an illegal activity, it does 
not receive First Amendment protection.  During the 1998 Washington Legal Foundation case, 
the District Court of the District of Columbia, as discussed above, defined the critical inquiry 
under Central Hudson prong number one as being whether the commercial speech encourages a 
lawful activity, and not, as the government suggested, whether the speech itself violates a law or 
regulation.
191  Tailoring their argument to that earlier court’s language, the government sought to 
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frame the issue in terms of promoting an illegal activity.  In the penultimate Washington Legal 
Foundation case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia accepted the agency’s 
interpretation of §§ 331(d), 355 of the FD&C Act, which rendered it illegal for a manufacturer to 
introduce a drug into interstate commerce if he intends that it be used for off-label purposes.
192  
Seizing upon this approval of their interpretation, the government argued in their Motion to 
Dismiss that advertisement of off-label uses does promote an unlawful activity: a manufacturer’s 
introduction of drugs into the stream of commerce with the intent that they be sold for the off-
label uses advertised.
193  Therefore, such speech should not receive First Amendment 
protection.
194  This argument fits the district court’s prior analysis, and the best move likely 
would be to focus on the FDA’s interpretation of § 352(n) as creating an overbroad restriction on 
speech. 
The government relied heavily on public policy consequences in defending the Agency’s 
interpretation.  The pre-market system of drug approval created by Congress in 1962 was 
intended to minimize the sale of unsafe or ineffective drugs.  The FDA’s ban on prescription 
drug advertisements that recommend or suggest off-label uses directly furthers this goal, because 
it prevents manufacturers from obtaining FDA approval for a narrow swath of uses, and then 
marketing the drug for a variety of other, untested uses.
195  Even though 21 C.F.R. § 
202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) bans both truthful and misleading advertisements without differentiation, the 
regulation is not overly broad under prong four of Central Hudson because the pre-1962 regime, 
which allowed all advertising claims and then prosecuted the makers of false and misleading 
ones after the fact, was recognized by the Supreme Court as “cumbersome,” failing to meet the 
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regulatory needs of the public.
196  The government then went on to criticize the less restrictive 
suggestions Allergan had put forth as undermining the FD&C Act’s goals.
197  By implication, the 
government argued that identifying other, less restrictive but overly permissive laws cannot lead 
to the conclusion that the current regime, which is broader but effective, is overly broad.  The 
government ended their argument by assuring the court that § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) only seeks to 
prevent promotional speech about off-label uses, and would not prevent drug and device 
manufacturers from supplying non-promotional safety information to physicians.
198 
  The fourth and final facial challenge Allergan presented involved a claim that the FDA’s 
“intended use” regulations were unconstitutional when used to restrict truthful, non-misleading 
speech about off-label uses.
199  In general, a drug is “misbranded” if its labeling does not contain 
“adequate directions for use.”
200  However, under § 353(b), prescription drugs are exempt from 
most of the FD&C Act’s labeling requirements, including the adequate directions provision.
201  
Instead, prescription drugs are misbranded only if their labeling does not exhibit the designator 
“Rx only.”
202  Per their regulations, the FDA interpreted the statutory exemptions to apply only if 
prescription drugs have labeling indicating “adequate information for its use.”
203  Because the 
FD&C Act specifically exempts prescription drugs from the “adequate directions for use” 
requirement, among other misbranding provisions, Allergan contended that the FDA requirement 
of “adequate information for use” is in direct conflict with the FD&C Act.
204 
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The government responded that there was no conflict, because Allergan was 
misinterpreting the FD&C Act to create an overly broad total exemption for prescription drugs 
from the “adequate directions for use” requirement.
205  Per the government’s interpretation, § 
353(b) affords only a more limited exemption, occurring at the point where the prescription drug 
is “prescribed and dispensed” by a physician.
206  Although the FD&C Act does not explicitly 
constrict the exception in this way, the FDA and the 5th Circuit have interpreted the exemption 
to take on these narrower contours based on the statutory language that the exemption applies to 
drugs that are “dispensed by filling or refilling” a prescription.
207  In support of this reading, the 
FDA cites the canon of interpretation that exemptions are to be read narrowly.
208  However, this 
is truly a very narrow reading of § 353(b).  Particularly given the scant case law supporting the 
agency’s interpretation, Allergan seems to be on solid footing in challenging the reasonableness 
of the FDA’s statutory reading. 
Allergan also contended that the FDA’s “intended use” regulations resulted in a “free-
speech Catch 22.”
209  21 C.F.R. § 201.100 defines “adequate information” to be information 
sufficient to allow physicians to “use the drug safely and for the purposes for which it is 
intended” (emphasis added).
210  Under 21 C.F.R. § 201.128, the “intended use” for a product is 
broadly determined by examining the maker’s “objective intent,” which can be shown not simply 
by the product’s labeling, but through other oral or written statements.
211  Additionally, FDA 
regulations impute an “intended use” upon a manufacturer who “knows, or has knowledge of 
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facts that would give him notice” about a use for the product.
212  Thus, if a manufacturer is aware 
of off-label uses for his product, under FDA regulations this is an intended use.  In order for 
“adequate information” to be present—allowing the drug to be exempt from certain labeling 
requirements—the manufacturer must place an explanation of this use on the label.
213  Yet under 
§§ 321(p) and 355(a), manufacturers are not allowed to discuss off-label uses as part of their 
product’s labeling.
214  Furthermore, Allergan claimed the FDA’s regulations prevent the very 
behavior they sought to induce.
215  In order to apply for a supplemental NDA, a company needs 
to not only have notice of an off-label use, they need compile data on the product’s safety and 
efficacy.  Yet having this knowledge and gathering data about the off-label use indicates the 
manufacturer’s “objective intent” that their product be utilized off-label, leaving the 
manufacturer in violation of misbranding provisions.
216    
  The government responded by first explaining the well-established rule that speech may 
be used as evidence of intended use, even if regulatory or criminal penalties are thereby 
triggered.
217  Then, the government corrected what they termed Allergan’s “mischaracterization” 
of 21 C.F.R. § 201.128.
218  The regulation states a manufacturer’s intended use “may” be 
indicated by its “oral or written statements,” but does not state that every statement about an off-
label use will inherently be treated as evidence of an intended use.
219  Citing only to the prior 
testimony of Dr. Temple, the government maintained it is the FDA’s position that certain 
statements about intended uses, namely non-promotional safety information, are not considered 
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evidence of “intended use” within the regulatory meaning of the phrase.
220  Similarly, FDA 
regulations did not require the Agency to treat a manufacturer’s knowledge of an intended use as 
objective intent to sell the product for an off-label use.
221  Instead, the FDA merely has the 
discretion to do so, and according to Dr. Temple, the agency “usually does not treat an 
unapproved use as an intended use solely because the manufacturer knows that the unapproved 
use is taking place.”
222  The government further asserted that the purported regulatory Catch-22 
was purely a function of Allergan’s impatience to promote their product before FDA approval of 
the new use.
223  This is because the FDA would not seek prosecution for misbranding based on a 
manufacturer waiting until their supplemental NDA was approved before changing the product’s 
labeling to add the formerly off-label uses.
224  If a manufacturer was pursuing trials toward the 
goal of approval for the off-label use, the Agency claimed it similarly would not prosecute the 
producer for distributing the drug in its current labeling, as long as the maker did not promote the 
off-label use.
225 
The government’s responses here seem to constitute a weak defense.  If the regulations 
grant the FDA permission to prosecute a manufacturer in such a situation, then a promise in a 
court brief that they will not exercise such authority does not answer a charge of constitutional 
defects.  The crux of Allergan’s claim is that the FDA regulatory scheme chills their protected 
commercial speech.  If the agency has broad discretion to prosecute drug and device 
manufacturers for their truthful speech, a defense that they don’t always exercise such authority 
is no defense at all.  The truthful speech is still chilled, regardless of whether the FDA chooses to 
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act on its ability to prosecute, and this makes it even more difficult for the government to argue 
that this system is truly not more broad than necessary.  Furthermore, the government’s 
arguments completely skirted the constitutional issue, which was whether the government may 
restrict a manufacturer’s truthful speech on such uses, and force the company to wait to speak 
until the FDA grants approval of the use. 
Although the majority of Allergan’s complaint discussed facial claims regarding the 
constitutionality of the prevailing statutory and regulatory scheme, Allergan also put forth an 
alternate argument that, at minimum, the prohibitions against their own truthful, non-misleading 
speech regarding a use for which they were seeking FDA approval were unconstitutional, and 
particularly incompatible with the fourth prong of Central Hudson.
226  As discussed previously, 
the government’s only recognized, substantial interest achieved through these speech restrictions 
is incentivizing manufacturers to obtain FDA approval for off-label uses.  However, if the 
manufacturer is in the process of seeking approval for the off-label use, the government interest 
in prohibiting speech about that off-label use no longer directly achieves their stated goal, 
rendering the restrictions excessively broad.
227   
The government’s response distinguished between supplemental NDAs as a means and 
an end.
228  Allergan’s argument implies the filing of the request for approval is an end, but 
instead, it is simply a means to allow the FDA to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug.
229  
If manufacturers could begin promoting off-label uses directly after filing a supplemental NDA, 
the effect would be to allow producers to advertise drugs that have not been proven to be safe 
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and effective, which runs counter to congressional intent in the FD&C Act.
230  Additionally, 
allowing Allergan and others to promote off-label uses as soon as they filed for FDA approval 
would incentivize premature, or even facetious, applications, simply to buy some time to 
promote the uses.
231  The government explained that they do, therefore, have an interest in 
maintaining the current regulatory scheme. 
Whether or not restrictions on off-label promotion were sufficiently tailored in situations 
when the supplemental NDA has already been filed is a legal issue that never saw the inside of a 
courtroom during the Allergan dispute.
232  On September 1, 2010, the Department of Justice 
announced a settlement deal with Allergan.  As part of the deal, Allergan dropped their First 
Amendment suit, an aspect of the settlement the DOJ did not mention when they issued a press 
release announcing the agreement.
233  The timing of the settlement hints at potential government 
angst over the effects of the Citizens United
234 decision.  According to Harvard Law professor 
Laurence Tribe, during the two decades preceding Allergan’s suit, the Supreme Court had been 
chipping away at earlier decisions limiting commercial free speech.
235  Based on the Court’s 
trend in this area, Professor Tribe believed Allergan had a strong chance at winning in the 
Supreme Court on a claim that they had a First Amendment right to make truthful, non-
misleading statements about off-label uses.
236  Professor Tribe made these comments before the 
decision in Citizens United was handed down, and that decision would have probably lent 
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additional weight to his prediction.  Although Citizens United dealt with political speech, not 
commercial speech,
237 the case powerfully emphasized the historical importance of First 
Amendment rights, both in general and specific to corporations.
238  The government may have 
feared a potentially damaging court result from which they would be unable to extricate 
themselves, as they had been able to do after the WLF litigation a decade earlier, through 
reinterpreting their guidance documents.  The Citizens United decision was announced a mere 
ten days after the government submitted its response to Allergan’s complaint, and it may have 
appeared to the government to be a final harbinger of things to come.  Only eight months later, 
the settlement was announced.    
Allergan’s argument regarding the unconstitutionality of restricting speech about off-
label uses that are pending FDA approval will not go undebated however, as it forms one of the 
central arguments in the most recent off-label speech case. Although the FDA was able to dodge 
the issue in the Washington Legal Foundation and Allergan cases, a recent Second Circuit case, 
United States v. Caronia,
239 may finally force the FDA to confront the First Amendment 
challenges they have heretofore evaded.  Caronia differs from Allergan in that the defendant is 
an individual, Alfred Caronia, and not a corporation.
240  Mr. Caronia, a sales representative for 
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Orphan Medical, was hired to sell Xyrem, a prescription drug approved to treat two conditions 
associated with narcolepsy, Excessive Daytime Sleepiness (EDS) and cataplexy.
241  Based on 
allegations that he promoted Xyrem to physicians for off-label uses, Mr. Caronia was charged 
with misbranding and conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce.
242  In 
his motion to dismiss, Mr. Caronia contended that the misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act, 
as applied to him, are an unconstitutional restriction on speech.
243  
  In response, the government—as they did in the Washington Legal Foundation cases—
again tried to argue that off-label promotion is conduct, not speech, and thus does not fall under 
the protection of the First Amendment.
244  However, a 2002 Supreme Court case, Thompson v. 
Western States Medical Center,
245 held that when pharmaceutical companies advertise 
compounded drugs
246 which can be lawfully sold by pharmacists, but themselves are not FDA 
approved, this is speech, not conduct.
247  Based on this reasoning, the district court believed any 
argument that Mr. Caronia had engaged in conduct was all but foreclosed.
248  Finding that Mr. 
Caronia had engaged in commercial speech, the court then applied the Central Hudson test.
249  
Concurring with the analysis in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman regarding prong one, 
the court agreed that this speech regarded a lawful activity and was not inherently misleading.
250  
In a cursory analysis, the court also agreed with Friedman’s finding of a substantial government 
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interest, incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to obtain FDA approval for current off-label 
uses, which was indeed directly served by the speech restrictions.
251   
As in Friedman, the main point of contention was whether the government could satisfy 
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
252  In addition to depending on the reasoning in 
Friedman, the Caronia court also drew inspiration from United States v. Caputo,
253 a 2003 
district court case that upheld the misbranding provisions in the FD&C Act.
254  The Northern 
District of Illinois found these restrictions to be not more restrictive than necessary, because 
allowing drug and device manufacturers to put forth any truthful, non-misleading promotional 
statement about an off-label use would cripple the FDA’s ability to evaluate off-label uses for 
safety and effectiveness.
255  The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but 
on other grounds, and only discussed the constitutional issues in dicta.
256  In commenting on the 
First Amendment implications, the court of appeals discussed the case in the context of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the previous year in Western States.  Western States invalidated 
portions of the FD&C Act, as amended by FDAMA, as unconstitutional restrictions on 
commercial speech.
257  The voided portions would have allowed pharmacies to advertise their 
compounding services, but prohibited them from promoting any particular compounded drugs, 
unless they first sought FDA approval.
258  The FDA was concerned that large-scale production of 
compounded drugs, which are exempt from the FDA “new drug” requirements, would allow 
pharmacists to evade the FDA’s system for ensuring safety and efficacy of products on the 
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market.  Advertising, then, was a proxy for large-scale operations: if a pharmacy compounded 
such a small amount of drugs that they did not advertise their product, then it was assumed the 
testing requirements would be completely unfeasible to implement.  Thus the pharmacy would 
be allowed to continue to skirt the FDA’s requirements.  If a pharmacy produced such a large 
quantity of compounded drugs that they wished to advertise their creation, this implied testing 
was feasible, and so the FDA would subject them to the approval process.
259   
The Supreme Court struck down this policy under Central Hudson analysis, explaining 
that the government had failed to show that their restriction was not more expansive than 
necessary to achieve their goal.
260  The Court chastised the government for failing to explore 
alternate means of reaching their objectives, emphasizing that “regulating speech must be a 
last—not first—resort.”
261  The very presence of multiple other, less restrictive means in this 
situation indicated the government was overstepping its bounds.
262  According to the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of Western States, the Supreme Court did indicate that some restrictions 
placed on drug makers from disseminating truthful, non-misleading statements about their 
product’s off-label uses are unconstitutional.
263  The boundaries between acceptable and 
unacceptable, however, were undefined, and the Seventh Circuit implied that courts, in creating 
the distinction, should reflect upon consequentialist policy considerations.
264  On the one hand, 
manufacturers have the most information about off-label uses, and if such practices are common 
and will be discussed by others, then it makes sense not to single out the party with the most 
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information and bar him from speaking.
265  On the other hand, allowing the off-label speech at 
issue could cause the FDA to withhold approval for drugs or devices that have common, but 
under-analyzed, off-label uses, harming consumers by decreasing their options.
266  The district 
court made clear that they recognized Caronia’s case “demands answers to the questions raised 
but not resolved by the Seventh Circuit in Caputo.”
267 
  The district court felt confident in distinguishing the prohibitions Caronia was 
challenging from those struck down in Western States.  The government in Western States had 
been unable to show that the speech restriction was truly necessary, and more than a mere 
convenient mechanism to achieve their goal.
268  In contrast, “the FDA's maintaining through the 
FDCA's misbranding provisions some control over the off-label promotion of manufacturers 
does appear essential to maintaining the integrity of the FDA's new drug approval process,” and 
thus passed the fourth prong of Central Hudson.
269  The court’s conclusion was buttressed by the 
perceived lack of non-speech restrictions that could still functionally operate to prevent 
manufacturers from being able to completely skirt the FDA approval process.
270   
The Eastern District of New York then denied Mr. Caronia’s motion to dismiss, and less 
than two months later, a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce.
271  He was sentenced to one year of probation, one hundred hours of 
community service, and a $25 fine.
272  Mr. Caronia appealed the case, both on procedural issues 
and the First Amendment claim.  Conceding that the first three prongs of Central Hudson were 
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met, Mr. Caronia focused on arguing that the restriction was overly broad.
273  A narrower rule 
suggested by the appellant was that the FDA could prohibit truthful, non-misleading speech 
about off-label uses only if those off-label uses are currently not pending FDA approval.
274  In 
this way, the government could still achieve its objective of incentivizing manufacturers to get 
uses on-label, without unduly burdening commercial speech or corrupting the integrity of the 
FDA approval process.
275 
On appeal, Mr. Caronia received eloquent and effective support on his First Amendment 
claims from the Washington Legal Foundation.  Although the Second Circuit initially indicated 
they would decide the case without hearing oral arguments, after receiving the WLF’s amicus 
brief, they agreed to hear from the parties, as well as the WLF.
276  In their brief, the WLF first 
focused on the government’s contention that this regulatory scheme bans conduct, and not 
promotional speech, because the speech is merely used as evidence of intent to engage in 
prohibited conduct.
277  Criticizing this argument as “semantic gamesmanship,” the WLF pointed 
out that Western States dealt with an analogous situation, yet the government in that case 
admitted they were regulating speech.
278  The relevant statute in Western States indirectly 
regulated speech in that a compounded drug became an unapproved “new drug” only if the 
pharmacy advertised or promoted the compound.
279  Thus, speech in Western States was used to 
determine whether a violation of the law was being committed, just as it is being used to 
determine a violation in off-label promotion cases such as Mr. Caronia’s.
280  By finding that the 
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analogous speech restrictions in Western States were unconstitutional, the WLF asserts that the 
Supreme Court established a rule that “the First Amendment governs laws that use speech as the 
determining factor over whether conduct is unlawful just as fully as a direct prohibition on 
speech,” and thus in Caronia, the government had no legitimate claim of regulating conduct.
281  
The WLF also drew support from the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Comm’n
282 and Greater New Orleans Board Ass’n v. United States
283 
(GNOBA) regarding speech restrictions resting on speaker-based distinctions.
284  The current 
regime allows doctors to speak to patients about off-label uses, but pharmaceutical companies 
and their employees (including physicians) are unable to speak to physicians about off-label 
uses.
285  Yet in GNOBA, the Supreme Court cautioned that “decisions that select among speakers 
conveying virtually identical messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding the 
First Amendment,”
286 and reiterated this message in Citizens United as well.
287 
The final argument the WLF focused on in their brief was Central Hudson’s fourth 
requirement that speech restrictions be proportionally tailored to the ends sought by the 
government.  While the WLF acknowledged that the governmental interest in incentivizing 
supplemental NDAs was a legitimate one, the speech restrictions failed to be narrowly tailored to 
this objective, because the government could have restricted less speech, or in the alternative, 
conduct.
288  WLF put forth several possible options the government could have considered.
289   
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On December 2, 2010, Judges Chin, Raggi, and Livingston of the Second Circuit heard 
oral arguments on United States v. Caronia.
290  The bench focused primarily on the First 
Amendment issues presented.
291  Judge Raggi pressed the WLF representative, Eric Murphy, on 
the fact that the fourth prong is not a least restrictive means test, but rather an issue of 
proportionality.
292  Murphy was able to respond by alluding to favorable language from Western 
States,
293 in which the Court cautioned that “if the Government could achieve its interest in a 
manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”
 294 
By stating that the government must “restrict[] less speech” if possible, the Supreme Court 
seemed to be modifying Central Hudson to imply that a proportionality analysis does entail an 
examination of least restrictive means.   utilize 
The bench seemed to question the government’s representative, Douglas Letter, more 
intensely.  Mr. Letter started by emphasizing that the government was restricting conduct, not 
speech, and that promotion of off-label use was merely employed as evidence of intent to 
introduce misbranded drugs (in other words, drugs lacking instructions for adequate use) into 
interstate commerce.
295  According to the government, it is the FDA’s policy that if drug 
manufacturers engage in certain speech, it will be taken as evidence of their intent, but in and of 
itself the speech about off-label uses is not a crime.
296  The judges seemed skeptical of this claim.  
Judge Livingston posed a hypothetical: if a drug manufacturer received a call from a pharmacy 
asking for a delivery of drugs in order to fill a substantial amount of off-label prescription 
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requests from physicians, would the drug manufacturer, in making the sale, exhibit intent to 
introduce misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, thus opening himself up to the same type 
of liability at issue in this case?
297  The government responded that the drug manufacturer would 
not be liable, because it would be exhibiting “subjective intent,” which is different than the 
“objective intent” the government discerns from promotional speech.
298  Although Judge 
Livingstone then pressed Mr. Letter for more examples of the distinction between subjective and 
objective intent, Mr. Letter did not give any additional clarity.  Judge Raggi asked whether this 
crime had ever been proven without promotional speech by the defendant, and Mr. Letter 
admitted he was unaware of any such case.
299 
The rest of the bench’s questions for the government probed whether less restrictive 
means existed to protect the integrity of the supplemental NDA process.
300  Judge Raggi asked 
Mr. Letter whether it would be acceptable to the FDA if the regulatory regime allowed 
manufacturers to discuss off-label uses only if those uses were currently pending approval before 
the FDA.
301  Once the application was filed, manufacturers could be permitted to speak about 
off-label uses, but only during a restricted time period, in order to prevent needless delays in 
filing required documents, designed only to lengthen the amount of time the applicants had to 
speak about off-label uses.
302  Judge Raggi, tipping her hand that she still did not buy the 
government’s argument that they weren’t prohibiting speech, stated that such a regime may be 
preferable to one that “completely preclude[s] speech.”
303   
                                                             
297 Id. at 9–10. 
298 Id. at 11. 
299 Id. at 10. 
300 Id. at 12–14. 
301 Id. at 12–13. 
302 Id. at 13.  
303 See id. 47 
 
Mr. Letter quickly corrected the judge by reminding her of the government’s position that 
they weren’t restricting speech, and then argued that such a regime would be unacceptable 
because it would expose the public to unsubstantiated claims during the approval process, which 
often takes years to complete.
304  Citing tragic public health disasters resulting from prescriptions 
for off-label uses that were perceived by the medical community to be safe, but caused serious 
side effects among users, the government portrayed Judge Raggi’s suggested regulatory regime 
as one that would be uncontrollable.  Judge Raggi, undeterred, suggested the government could 
quickly halt sales of drugs for off-label uses if such a problem came up, and that the dangers of 
such situations occurring were outweighed by the value of having more speech in the 
marketplace.
305  Mr. Letter responded by portraying the government’s position as one that also 
strove to provide more speech in the marketplace: by channeling more drugs through the 
approval process, doctors would have access to more information on a drug’s safety and 
efficacy.
306  
The Second Circuit’s decision could instigate real change in the FDA regulatory scheme 
of off-label promotion.  Given the bench’s skepticism towards the government’s position during 
oral arguments, it would not be surprising if the Second Circuit concluded that under Central 
Hudson, restrictions on commercial speech regarding off-label uses are overly broad when the 
manufacturer has already applied for a supplemental NDA.  Because Mr. Caronia’s as-applied 
challenge focuses only on manufacturers with pending supplemental NDAs, a decision in the 
appellant’s favor would yield permission to speak in only a relatively narrow range of situations.  
But such an outcome would still trigger new FDA regulations and thus—hopefully—clear areas 
of acceptable behavior.  This stands in stark contrast to the FDA’s current guidance, which 
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purports to create safe harbors for manufacturers, but is ultimately not binding on the FDA.  The 
decision could propel the FDA toward greater clarity in other areas of their regulatory regime as 
well.    
Given the current ambiguity, rooted in the FDA’s back-pedaling during the WLF 
litigation, such changes may reap benefits to society at large.  When the rules are clearer and 
offer pharmaceutical companies a bit more leeway to speak about emerging new uses, these 
producers may violate the regulations less.  As a result, taxpayer-funded enforcement efforts 
would decrease, and drug companies would no longer need to pass on these costs of regulatory 
compliance to consumers.  Individuals and groups that criticized the FDA for its January 2009 
guidance document
307 would strenuously object to any expanded ability to discuss off-label uses, 
and finding a way to appease these advocacy groups will make for a smoother transition.  The 
FDA may also need to get creative in crafting regulations that will diminish the incentives for 
manufacturers to rush in a supplemental NDA, in order to prevent abuse.  For example, 
companies could use the intervening time to heavily advertise an off-label use, banking on the 
fact that, regardless of whether they ultimately can prove safety and efficacy to the FDA, doctors 
may become accustomed to prescribing the drug off-label.  While there are legitimate dangers 
that manufacturers may exploit this exercise of First Amendment rights, the theme that emerged 
at the end of the Caronia oral arguments in the Second Circuit—that more speech is generally 
better—seems accurate here.  Drug companies do a tremendous amount of research, and often 
hire top experts in the field to discuss their products.  Muzzling these actors, who know more 
about their product than anyone else in the market, seems to be an inappropriately blunt 
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approach.  The FDA can promulgate regulations to create a more nuanced system that still aligns 
manufacturer incentives with patient safety, and harnesses their speech to move beneficial 
therapies from producers to consumers.    